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In a concurring judgment in Thomas v Mowbray, a High Court of Australia 
case turning on the Constitutional validity of terrorism-related control 
orders, Callinan J offers a re-evaluation of the Court’s earlier decision in 
the Australian Communist Party case to curtail executive power. According 
to Callinan J, factual matters knowable (but not known) at the time of the 
earlier decision might have given rise to a different outcome. In a dissenting 
judgment by Kirby J in the same case the Court’s reasoning in the Australian 
Communist Party case is robustly defended. These contested issues connect 
with the theoretical dispute between ‘common law constitutionalism’ and 
‘constitutional positivism’ analysed by Dyzenhaus in the context of states of 
emergency where the limits of executive action and the role of supporting 
facts become particularly salient. They press the question of the status of the 
rule of law in the international as well as in the municipal sphere. 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
Long after the waning of its political influence (although such an epitaph can 
only be tentative), the Australian Communist Party continues to exert an 
important influence on the jurisprudence of the Commonwealth. Thus the 
terrorism-related interim control order case of Thomas v Mowbray1
                                                 
∗ Associate Head, Law School, Deakin University. Thanks to Oscar Roos for introducing me to 
Thomas’ case, and to Rachel Carter for research assistance. 
 includes a 
significant re-evaluation, on the part of Callinan J, of the High Court of 
1 Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307. 
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Australia’s earlier decision in the Australian Communist Party case.2 Callinan 
J’s proposition in Thomas is that factual matters of geopolitics not apparent at 
the time of the Communist Party case may, if known, have given rise to a 
different outcome, that is to say to an outcome endorsing the position of the 
executive of the day in its prohibition of communist activities. The specific 
point made by Callinan J is that the scale of the Soviet military and political 
threat towards, inter alia, Australia in the early years of the Cold War might 
have sufficed to influence the Court’s deliberations over the constitutional 
legitimacy of the executive’s attempted prohibition of the Party and its 
persecution of those identified as communists. In a dissenting judgment by 
Kirby J, on the other hand, the wisdom of the Court’s reasoning in the 
Communist Party case – rejecting the arguments of the executive – is robustly 
defended.3
 
  
A Dyzenhaus and Common Law Constitutionalism 
 
The decision in the Communist Party case is also defended in the academic 
writings of David Dyzenhaus as a shining example of ‘common law 
constitutionalism’.4 It has been argued by Dyzenhaus that the bench of a 
Constitutional court such as the High Court of Australia is faced in its 
deliberations with a stark if frequently unacknowledged choice. Either it can 
treat the Federal (or correspondingly supreme) Constitution in an instrumental 
and a pragmatic manner as a document that ‘merely’ sets out a template for 
the separation of powers; or it can treat it as a document that manifests a set of 
higher values relating to the rule of law, of which the separation of powers is 
but a facet or an index, such that the Constitution instantiates a ‘common law 
constitution’.5
                                                 
2 Australian Communist Party v The Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1. In the light of the 
central issues of Thomas v Mowbray, Callinan J’s discussion of the Australian Communist 
Party case clearly has the status of obiter dicta. 
 Common law constitutionalism is therefore an orientation to 
constitutional aspects of the legal system which treats those aspects as 
embodying the values underpinning the common law. According to this 
viewpoint, it is a mistake to treat the separation of powers as significant or 
3 Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 484 (Callinan J); 442 (Kirby J). Also see Oscar 
Roos, ‘Alarmed, But Not Alert in the “War on Terror”? The High Court, Thomas v Mowbray 
and the Defence Power’ (2008) 15 James Cook University Law Review 169, 200.  
4 David Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency (2006) 73.   
5 Ibid 99. Common law constitutionalism is sometimes referred to by Dyzenhaus as the 
‘aspirational conception’. For a contrasting perspective see Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The 
Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy (1999). There is of course more (or 
sometimes less) to any Constitution than a provision for the separation of powers; however the 
separation of powers is an appropriate, as well as an iconic, focus for these issues. 
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effective in itself. Rather, the separation of powers only ‘works’ to the extent 
that deeper values are being called upon and indeed implemented.  
While the distinction may not always be patent either in the decision of the 
court or in the conscious awareness of the judges, it is undoubtedly a 
theoretically significant one. It connotes a choice to be made by the judiciary 
between posited law on the one hand, and a larger value system on the other, 
as providing the touchstone for judicial decision-making. Dyzenhaus urges 
that judges should make the latter choice (that is to say, in favour of common 
law constitutionalism). He refers to the former choice, unsurprisingly, as 
favouring a positivistic attitude, namely ‘constitutional positivism’.6
an evolving or living constitution ... [T]he judicial understanding of its 
content has been irrevocably changed by the international human rights 
regimes and other constitutional experiments of the last fifty or so years.
 
According to Dyzenhaus, the common law constitution is  
7
 
    
B Other Versions of Common Law Constitutionalism 
 
Common law constitutionalism has been said to characterise the recent 
decision of the House of Lords in Jackson v Attorney General, a case arising 
from UK legislation prohibiting fox-hunting, which raised constitutional 
questions relating to the status of the House of Lords.8 Writing about that 
case, Mullen observes, for example, that ‘[i]n recent years, the theory which 
has become known as “common law constitutionalism” has gained ground 
both among academic writers and the judges’.9
In the context of a related debate – the debate over the desirability of 
entrenching constitutional provisions – the position of Waluchow has also 
been described, by Mildenberger, as representing ‘common law 
constitutionalism’.
 
10
                                                 
6 Ibid (Dyzenhaus) 16. 
 The entrenching of particular constitutional provisions 
means that future generations of legislators have an extraordinarily high 
threshold to surmount if they wish to change such provisions. Waluchow’s 
7 Ibid 190. 
8 Jackson v Her Majesty's Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56; also see Jeremy Waldron, ‘Are 
Constitutional Norms Legal Norms?’ (2006) 75 Fordham Law Review 1697, 1702.  
9 Tom Mullen, ‘Reflections on Jackson v Attorney General: Questioning sovereignty’ (2007) 
27 Legal Studies 1, 13. 
10 Joshua Mildenberger, ‘Waldron, Waluchow and the Merits of Constitutionalism’ (2009) 29 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 71. 
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position is supportive of such entrenching in principle, since it may be thought 
of as the manifestation of deep and long-standing moral commitments of a 
community.11 According to Waluchow, the constitution is a ‘living tree’ 
which ‘grows and adapts to contemporary circumstances, trends and 
beliefs’.12
Waluchow’s version of common law constitutionalism, which would thus 
seem highly compatible with Dyzenhaus’, is contrasted by Mildenberger with 
the ‘democratic majoritarianism’ of Jeremy Waldron, for whom the 
entrenching of constitutional provisions represents ‘the dead hand of the past’ 
and is profoundly undemocratic. The position of Waluchow is not entirely 
identical with that of Dyzenhaus, and the position of Waldron is perhaps not 
adequately summed up as ‘constitutional positivism,’ but the basic contrast 
holds and the contrastive terms are useful ones. Common law 
constitutionalism and its ‘fellow-travellers’, represent the claim that a judicial 
appeal to larger values will sometimes be needed, if only ‘when push comes 
to shove’ and in particular in the situation of emergency as discussed in 
Thomas v Mowbray. Constitutional provisions will never be enough in 
themselves, argue Dyzenhaus and Waluchow, to protect basic freedoms.  
  
 
C Constitutional Positivism 
 
In contrast, constitutional positivism denies the claims made on behalf of 
common law constitutionalism, treating it indeed as a dangerous form of 
‘backsliding’ from democratic governance. This position, if not the positivist 
label, is endorsed by Lynch and Reilly who, in discussing the counter-
terrorism legislation under consideration in Thomas v Mowbray, observe that 
there is no need for recourse to the rule of law ‘as a fount of common law 
constitutionalism’.  
Instead, the separation of powers doctrine provides a clear framework through 
which that broader assumption [of the rule of law] may be brought to bear 
upon this particular legislative initiative.13
                                                 
11 WJ Waluchow, A Common Law Theory of Judicial Review: The Living Tree (2007) 203; WJ 
Waluchow, ‘Legality, Morality, and the Guiding Function of Law’ in Matthew H Kramer, 
Claire Grant, Ben Colburn and Antony Hatzistavrou (eds), The Legacy of H.L.A. Hart: Legal, 
Political and Moral Philosophy (2008) 85, 95. 
  
12 Waluchow, A Common Law Theory of Judicial Review, above n 11, 55 (footnote omitted). 
13 Andrew Lynch and Alexander Reilly ‘The Constitutional Validity of Terrorism Orders of 
Control and Preventative Detention’ (2007) 10 Flinders Journal of Law Reform 105, 129.  
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Thus constitutional positivists and their fellow travellers assert that proper 
procedure is adequate, at least in principle. For example, they assert that the 
separation of powers is adequate to serve its intended democratic functions of 
setting limits on executive power, and that majoritarian processes in 
parliament are adequate to express the will of the people, without recourse to 
entrenched decisions of previous generations. 
 
D National Emergencies and Executive Autonomy  
 
The distinction between constitutional positivism and common law 
constitutionalism is of course a variant of the hundreds of years’ war in legal 
philosophy between natural law and legal positivism.14 In times of tranquillity 
the distinction may be somewhat academic and may not matter a great deal. 
But in times of emergency, when the executive branch is tempted or 
pressurised into overlooking constraints on its power,15
These questions have arisen in many places and over many centuries, not least 
in the place and time in which common law and presumably a ‘common law 
constitution’ emerged: early modern England. The England of the Tudors, and 
the England-plus-Scotland of the Stuarts and their successor regimes, provide 
numerous examples of the effective, if scarcely democratic, management of 
state emergency.
 the distinction may be 
crucial – as indeed Dyzenhaus has stressed. Thus, as Dyzenhaus points out, 
these theoretical questions are central to the debate over the proper limits of 
executive action in the context of national emergencies.  
16
                                                 
14 John R Morss, ‘Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution? Legal Positivism and Legal 
Education’ (2008) 18 Legal Education Review 55; John R Morss, ‘Pride’s Purge: A Puritanical 
Response to Dr Allan’s “A Modest Proposal”’ (2005) 30 Australian Journal of Legal 
Philosophy 82.  
 The point of course is that while the questions have arisen, 
15 Greg Carne, ‘Hasten Slowly: Urgency, Discretion and Review – A Counter-Terrorism 
Legislative Agenda and Legacy’ (2008) 13 Deakin Law Review 49; Julie Cassidy, ‘Hollow 
Avowals of Human Rights Protection – Time for an Australian Federal Bill of Rights? (2008) 
13 Deakin Law Review 131; Conor Gearty, ‘The Superpatriotic Fervour of the Moment’ (2008) 
28 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 183-200; Scott Guy and Barbara Hocking, ‘Why Military 
Matters: Re Colonel Aird; Ex Parte Alpert and the ‘Service Connection’ Test versus the 
‘Service Status’ Test: Competing Approaches to the Triggering of the Defence Power’ (2008) 
13 Deakin Law Review 177. 
16 Eg Star Chamber, discussed by Geoffrey Robertson, ‘Fair Trials for Terrorists?’ in Richard 
Ashby Wilson (ed) Human Rights and the War on Terror (2005) 169, 171. Also see Eric 
Heinze, ‘Power Politics and the Rule of Law: Shakespeare’s First Historical Tetralogy and 
Law’s “Foundations”’ (2009) 29 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 139; and, on Hale, see Gerald 
Postema, ‘Conformity, Custom, and Congruence: Rethinking the Efficacy of Law’ in Matthew 
H Kramer, Claire Grant, Ben Colburn and Antony Hatzistavrou (eds), The Legacy of H.L.A. 
Hart: Legal, Political and Moral Philosophy (2008) 45, 46. 
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debate has been suppressed in these circumstances: debate might be said to be 
the first victim of a state of emergency, just as logic is ‘the first casualty of 
war’.17
The need for debate, and the political suppression of that debate, arise 
irrespective of whether the emergencies occur as a response to international 
political movements or to international terrorism, or indeed to events defined 
as internal. The distinction between internal and international threats is itself 
of limited value: Geoffrey Robertson, for example, nicely refers to ‘terrorism, 
or treason as it was called then’ in reference to 17th century England.
  
18 In this 
connection it might also be recalled that when ‘Lord Haw-Haw’ (William 
Joyce), Irish-American radio propagandist for the Nazi regime during World 
War II, went to the gallows in post-war London, it was for treason.19
 
  
II THE AUSTRALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY CASE 
RECONSTRUCTED 
 
In connection with the analysis of the role of the judiciary in limiting 
executive power, Dyzenhaus has argued that the decision of the High Court of 
Australia in the Australian Communist Party case represented a triumph for 
common law constitutionalism, a view that would seem to be shared in effect 
by at least one recent member of that Court, namely Michael Kirby.  
In the Australian Communist Party case the High Court considered the 
constitutional legality of a proscription of the Australian Communist Party by 
the Menzies administration in 1950. Notably, the proposed legislation went 
beyond the abolition of the Party itself and of affiliated organisations to the 
imposition of significant limitations in respect of public service employment 
for any person ‘declared’ by the executive to be a communist.20
Indeed it was as a result of the Commonwealth executive overreaching itself, 
in thus encroaching on the judicial function, that ‘the Communist Party 
Dissolution Act foundered’.
  
21
                                                 
17 Robertson, above n 16, 169. 
 The usual role of legislation would be to define 
18 Ibid 171.  
19 Joyce v Director of Public Prosecutions [1946] AC 347. 
20 George Winterton, ‘The Communist Party Case’ in HP Lee and George Winterton (eds), 
Australian Constitutional Landmarks (2003) 108, 117. 
21 Ibid 127. 
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prohibited acts or omissions – in this case subversive mischiefs to be factually 
linked to named individuals only by means of the independent judicial process 
with its procedural safeguards. Instead, the Act declared in its preamble the 
factual connection between the subversive acts and what were in effect named 
individuals (viz persons identified as communists). The constitutionally 
guaranteed separation of powers had been compromised.  
Significantly, comparable legislation (that is, legislation to regulate voluntary 
associations) enacted by any of the Australian States, rather than by the 
Commonwealth, might not have been unconstitutional. Australia’s federal 
Constitution limits, and to some extent defines, the extent to which powers of 
the States are referred to the Commonwealth as such. Thus it was ‘the 
institution of federalism that incidentally provided the civil rights protection 
for which [the Communist Party case] has become celebrated.’22
 
  
A The Fear of Communism 
 
Governmental prohibitions of, or constraints upon, the functioning of 
communist organisations are premised on the characterisation of communism 
as an international conspiracy.23 Witch-hunt parables for inquisitions into 
communist infiltration (as generally understood to be exemplified by Miller’s 
play The Crucible) are a reminder of the medieval and early modern sense of 
Satanic influence as a kind of international conspiracy. This discourse 
remained significant in the context of state fears of international religious 
conspiracies, for example by militant Catholics in a Protestant England,24 
pursuing what Geoffrey Robertson has called ‘Jesuit religious terrorism’.25
                                                 
22 Dan Meagher, ‘Back to the Future: The War on Terror and its Impact on Civil Liberties’ 
(2004) 15 Public Law Review 177, 178.  
 In 
the twentieth century, state fears (in the West) of international communist 
conspiracies, and their mirror-image in the communist East, represent at least 
to some extent the descendant of those earlier manifestations of the siege 
mentality in the executive. In a more intense and brutal form, so do the 
regimes of state repression that characterised Argentina and neighbouring 
23 Also see Martin Krygier, ‘The Quality of Civility: Post-anti-communist Thoughts on Civil 
Society and the Rule of Law’ in András Sajó (ed), Out of and Into Authoritarian Law (2002) 
221. 
24 Nicholl refers to the dependence of the government under Elizabeth I on a ‘maverick army of 
intelligencers and projectors’ in the context not only of a genuine need for information by the 
executive but also ‘political expediency, ... courtly in-fighting, [and] police-state repression’: 
Charles Nicholl, The Reckoning: The Murder of Christopher Marlowe (1992) 265. 
25 Robertson, above n 16, 170. 
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states in the 1970s.26
 
 In the present millennium cognate state fears are centred 
on international terrorist conspiracies. 
B The Communist Party Case, Constitutional 
Positivism and Dyzenhausian Hermeneutics 
As noted above, the outcome in the Communist Party case has been attributed 
to the High Court majority giving due weight to the federal provisions in 
Australia’s Constitution, an approach apparently more in keeping with 
‘constitutional positivism’ than with an attachment to common law values as 
such as guiding the evaluation of statute. Dyzenhaus recognises the 
plausibility of this ‘constitutional positivist’ reading27 but discerns the need 
for a deeper layer of interpretive methodology. According to Dyzenhaus, the 
High Court’s detailed attention to the constitutional text reflects a state of 
‘dissonance’ on the part of the (majority) bench, in relation to the alternative 
explanatory frameworks that he has described (common law and positivist). 
Dyzenhaus goes so far as to suggest an attitude of avoidance on the part of the 
bench, that is, say a refusal to confront what he calls ‘the only solid answer to 
the question of the legal limits on the power of both Parliament and the 
executive’.28 This answer is, for Dyzenhaus, ‘that the source of these limits is 
to be found in the common law, which supports both a constitutional doctrine 
of judicial independence and a sense of the fundamental values which that 
independence is supposed to serve’.29 More generally, for Dyzenhaus, ‘a 
division of powers constitution offers an opportunity to judges minded to 
adopt an aspirational conception to hide that conception behind constitutional 
text’. However, he continues, ‘it would be better for them to articulate their 
common law constitutionalism fully’.30
Dyzenhaus’ hermeneutic account of the Communist Party case might be 
thought to be over-influenced by his theoretical position. The ‘constitutional 
positivist’ interpretation that he admits is the more plausible on its face needs 
to be corrected, he asserts, by hermeneutic analysis concerning psychological 
processes such as ‘dissonance’ and ‘avoidance’. The issues Dyzenhaus has 
raised concerning the rationale for limits on the executive are more important 
 
                                                 
26 Fernando Tesón, ‘Liberal Security’ in Richard Ashby Wilson (ed) Human Rights and the 
War on Terror (2005) 57, 58; Tesón continues: ‘[d]emocratic societies can be besieged as much 
by fundamental Islamic terrorists as by ... the Mafia or drug lords’: at 59 (emphasis added). 
27 Dyzenhaus, above n 4, 76. 
28 Ibid 86. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid 72. 
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than the matter of how convincing his academic account of one case may be 
said to be. In any event it is important to take account of the (albeit obiter) 
reconsiderations of the Communist Party case recently presented in the High 
Court itself in the case of Thomas v Mowbray.  
 
C Thomas v Mowbray: The High Court Revisits the 
Communist Party Case 
 
The litigation in Thomas v Mowbray arose from the enactment of Division 
104 of the Criminal Code (Cth), itself a governmental response to the ‘War on 
Terror’ environment after 9/11. Division 104 provides for control orders to be 
made against individuals associated with terrorist organisations, and an 
interim control order had been made by a Federal Magistrate against the 
plaintiff Thomas, imposing a curfew and reporting obligations on him and 
significantly restricting his activities. In concurring with the view that 
Division 104 is constitutionally valid, Callinan J drew extensive comparisons 
(and some important contrasts) with the enactment in question in the 
Communist Party case. This occasioned on the part of Callinan J a remarkable 
re-evaluation of the High Court’s reasoning in that earlier case. Meanwhile, in 
a dissenting judgment, Kirby J strenuously defended the probity and wisdom 
of the Communist Party outcome.31
For Callinan J, the Commonwealth had in the earlier dispute unwisely sought 
to rely on the mere recital of facts in the preamble to the Communist Party 
Dissolution Act in order to sustain the invocation of the defence power in the 
Constitution.
 
32
Callinan J’s discussion of the Communist Party decision thus indicates that 
notorious factual information such as geopolitical facts should in principle be 
available to the High Court bench in its deliberations. This is not to say that 
 In other words the necessary ‘constitutional facts’ were not 
properly established. In the view of Callinan J, with the information available 
after the end of the Cold War the extent of the threat posed to Australia by 
international communism, especially as controlled from Moscow in those 
Cold War years, was factually established. The threat was in fact adequate to 
support the Commonwealth government’s proposed legislation. That is to say, 
in Callinan J’s view the invocation of the defence power was justified by the 
geopolitical situation in 1950.  
                                                 
31 In a previous dissent, Kirby J had argued that the Communist Party case shows the invalidity 
of any enactment or executive act that depends on ‘the conclusive assertion or opinion of the 
Parliament (eg expressed in recitals to an Act) ... It remains for the judiciary in each contested 
case to interpret the applicable law’: Al-Kateb v Goodwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 618.  
32 Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 486 (Callinan J). 
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the outcome of the Communist Party case is being questioned by Callinan J – 
there were serious flaws in the legislation at issue which justified the 
outcome. Nevertheless, ‘subsequent events which might tend to falsify some 
of the factual assumptions upon which parts of the reasoning were based, 
should [not] be ignored’. Thus ‘it is revelatory history itself, which gives rise 
to questions about aspects of the case’.33
The argument by Callinan J might be thought of as an application or a 
development of the appeal to political reality that had apparently been 
endorsed in 1999 in Sue v Hill.
  
34 Here, the High Court had held that in the 
years since Federation, the UK had become a ‘foreign power’ in relation to 
section 44(i) of the Constitution such that dual British citizenship would 
disqualify an Australian citizen from election to the House of Representatives 
or to the Senate. Michael McHugh, a member of the High Court bench in Sue 
v Hill, has referred to this decision favourably as an example of ‘modern 
political perceptions [being] given precedence over the literal meaning of the 
terms of the Constitution’.35
Whatever linkages are discerned between the disqualification (section 44(i)) 
issue in Sue v Hill and the retrospective Cold War issue raised by Callinan J in 
Thomas v Mowbray, it may be argued that in both cases the competence of the 
High Court in relation to the prerogative of the executive is at stake. If only 
under traditional English common law, if not the common law understood as 
still obtaining alongside the Constitution of Australia, the identification of 
enemy states would seem a matter for the executive – (‘The Prince’, so to 
speak). Furthermore, one might have thought that the term ‘foreign power’ 
might also be a matter for executive discretion rather than judicial notice. This 
argument is rejected by the majority in Sue v Hill, for whom the decision with 
which the Court was faced was not about qualitative aspects of the 
relationship between states – proper matters for executive discretion – but 
merely (objectively, as it were) about ‘questions of international and domestic 
sovereignty.’
  
36
                                                 
33 Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 503 (Callinan J). 
 In dissent, Callinan J points out in Sue v Hill, however, that 
34 Sue v Hill (1999) 199 CLR 462. 
35 Michael McHugh, ‘The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the High Court: 1989-2004’ (2008) 
30 Sydney Law Review 5, 25. 
36 Sue v Hill (1999) 199 CLR 462, 487 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ). At this point in 
the judgment footnote [50] points to theoretical questions on international law raised by HLA 
Hart’s Chapter X in The Concept of Law (1961); on which also see Jeremy Waldron, ‘Hart and 
the Principles of Legality’ in Matthew H Kramer, Claire Grant, Ben Colburn and Antony 
Hatzistavrou (eds), The Legacy of H.L.A. Hart: Legal, Political and Moral Philosophy (2008) 
67, 83; John R Morss, ‘Sources of Doubt, Sources of Duty: HLA Hart on International Law’ 
(2005) 10 Deakin Law Review 41. 
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‘foreign power’ tends in various items of Australian legislation to connote an 
enemy, broadly speaking.  
 
D The Separation of Powers and Five Types of Legal 
Fact 
 
The demarcation point between the powers of the executive and of the 
judiciary might not bear too much weight perhaps in the Sue v Hill situation. 
Electoral disqualification is not usually thought of as a matter of national 
security. However the assessment of military and political threat as in the case 
of the former USSR in the early 1950s would assuredly have been claimed by 
the executive as its own to make, if only with a view to precedent should it 
have neglected to do so. The important point here is that any proposal by the 
judiciary to widen the scope of judicial notice for the reception of factual 
information inevitably raises concerns, perhaps including concerns about laws 
of evidence and the role of expert witnesses. Where the facts at issue are 
geopolitical facts pertinent to national security, the concerns would include 
worries about the separation of powers.  
In the context of Thomas v Mowbray, Heydon J (also concurring) 
distinguishes five categories of ‘facts which may have to be established in 
litigation’.37 Strictly speaking, rules of evidence apply only to the first 
category of facts (ordinary questions of fact as disputed by parties to private 
litigation).38 For the other categories broader criteria for judicial reception are 
appropriate. Thus, for ‘facts going to the constitutional validity of statutes’ 
(‘constitutional facts’), the Court may take account of its members’ broader 
knowledge of its society.39 Significantly, constitutional facts are often 
controversial and for that reason unavailable under conventional judicial 
notice.40 Heydon J’s view of the acceptability of constitutional facts is in that 
respect somewhat broader, if anything, than that of Callinan J. The same 
judicial latitude, it is said by Heydon J, applies to facts in the fifth category – 
to facts that go to ‘the content and development of the common law’.41 
Heydon J expresses a serious caveat concerning constitutional facts: ‘[i]f 
judicial power to find constitutional facts were wholly untrammelled, there 
would be risks of great abuse.’42
                                                 
37 Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 512 (Heydon J). 
 It may well be that corresponding caution is 
38 See John R Morss, ‘Can Custom Be Incorporated in Law? On the Place of the Empirical in 
the Identification of Norms’ (2008) 53 American Journal of Jurisprudence 85, 91. 
39 Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 519 (Heydon J). 
40 Ibid 517. 
41 Ibid 512.  
42 Ibid 522. 
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appropriate in regard to facts of the fifth category, although this would be to 
extrapolate Heydon J’s point.  
Some articulation of the fifth category of facts, in which judicial fact-finding 
contributes to the content and development of the common law, may be 
achieved by considering the way in which the common law constitution itself 
is said to evolve. As noted above, that constitution is, for Dyzenhaus, ‘an 
evolving or living constitution’. Similarly, for Waluchow, the constitution 
‘grows and adapts to contemporary circumstances, trends and beliefs’. Such 
extra-judicial sources of influence on the common law are thus, in effect, 
granted the status of facts. For example, admitting aspects of international 
law, especially customary international law, into municipal common law, 
irrespective of statutory implementation,43
 
 would seem to involve an appeal to 
facts rather than to judicial authority. This issue is explored further in Section 
IV below. It is somewhat ironic that common law constitutionalism, with its 
concern for values, comes to rely on the identification of some of those values 
as facts for legal consumption. 
III THE COMMON LAW, THE RULE OF LAW, AND THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 
  
A Perceived Limitations of Constitutional Positivism 
According to Dyzenhaus, the turn to constitutional positivism ‘with its 
insistence on the rigid separation of powers’ is ‘depressing’ and ‘a retreat’.44 
Constitutional positivism for Dyzenhaus connotes a ‘dualism’ of, on the one 
hand, statute law and, on the other, the principles of the rule of law as 
manifested in the common law.45 Constitutional positivism therefore has an 
impoverished view of the rule of law. In contrast, according to Dyzenhaus, 
common law constitutionalism properly represents and articulates the rule of 
law. To express the Dyzenhausian dichotomy a different way, the choice is 
between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ versions of the rule of law, where the latter 
(corresponding to constitutional positivism) is ‘merely’ procedural46
                                                 
43 See Morss, ‘Can Custom Be Incorporated in Law?’, above n 38, 93. 
 and the 
former (corresponding to common law constitutionalism) is enhanced or 
completed by recourse to a value system. That is to say that an adequate 
44 Dyzenhaus, above n 4. 
45 Ibid 191. 
46 Ibid 199; on procedural justice, see John R Morss, ‘Crime Stories: Posnerian Pragmatism, 
Rawlsian Pure Procedural Justice, and the Fictional Problem’ (2004) 9(2) Deakin Law Review 
643.   
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understanding of the concept of the rule of law requires, according to 
Dyzenhaus, reference to implicit value systems and to interpretive traditions 
that by definition transcend national legal systems and their positive 
enactments.47
Constitutional positivism is said to be dualistic in three respects: 1) in the 
sense noted above; 2) in relation to its attitude to international law; and 3) in 
its approach to the law of emergency circumstances.
 Dyzenhaus’ approach is holistic. 
48 As to the third of these, 
constitutional positivism is said to make the mistake of drawing a distinction 
between the prerogative state that responds to an emergency, and the ‘rule-of-
law state’ which operates between emergencies.49
Consistent with his general position, Dyzenhaus argues that the limitations of 
constitutional positivism arise from its narrow focus and its unwillingness to 
read beyond the text. For Dyzenhaus (as for Michael Kirby) constitutional 
positivism is an impoverished approach. In relation to judicial decisions on 
the limits of executive power, constitutional positivism is exemplified by the 
reliance by the judiciary on the separation of powers. Simply put, Dyzenhaus 
strongly asserts that the separation of powers, as provided in a constitutional 
document such as that of the Commonwealth of Australia or the USA, is 
insufficient by itself to protect the citizenry from the excesses of government. 
Instead, according to Dyzenhaus, such desirable protection calls for a 
cooperative and proactive endeavour on the part of the judiciary, the executive 
and the legislature, working towards shared goals: the rule of law as a troika, 
so to speak.
 Thus one of the ways in 
which, according to Dyzenhaus, constitutional positivism devalues or 
impoverishes the rule of law is in treating it as adequate for times of stability 
but inadequate for times of severe threat to the state.  
50
B The Separation of Powers 
 
 
Callinan J’s ‘Cold Warrior’ outburst in Thomas v Mowbray, if it may be thus 
described without disrespect, presents a challenge to our understanding of the 
separation of powers within the Australian Constitution. And the separation of 
powers is of immense significance in relation to the issuing of control orders 
and suchlike encumbrances on personal liberty, as directly examined in 
Thomas.  
                                                 
47 Randy Peerenboom, ‘The Future of Rule of Law: Challenges and Prospects for the Field’ 
(2009) 1 Hague Journal on The Rule of Law 5. 
48 Dyzenhaus, above n 4, 191. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid 147. 
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That understanding is itself uncertain. The role of the executive branch, and 
the proper limits of its power within the federal polity, have resisted 
authoritative definition for some while. Winterton has commented on the 
relative neglect by commentators and indeed by the High Court itself of an 
examination of the executive power of the Commonwealth, observing that 
throughout the common law world at least, ‘executive power has always been 
something of a mystery, frequently being defined merely as the “residue” of 
governmental powers after legislative and judicial powers are excluded’.51
The separation of powers as provided in the Constitution of Australia is 
understood by the High Court not merely on the basis of the textual provisions 
of the Constitution in itself, but also on the basis of its earlier deliberations on 
that document, that is to say on a common law tradition of some kind. The 
form taken by common law in the context of Australia’s Constitution is 
substantially distinct from its form in its foreign origins. As Pamela Tate has 
observed: 
   
Invoking the language and logic of the common law may distract from an 
appreciation of the historical force of the Constitution as the instrument that 
established the Australian federal system; an instrument dividing legislative, 
executive and judicial authority between the Commonwealth and the States 
and creating the federal judiciary as the final arbiter.52
In the same vein, Tate warns against an ‘illusion of continuity’ in the 
Constitutional role of common law. One must, according to Tate, be cautious 
about treating ‘implied constitutional guarantees drawn from the [English] 
common law as comprising the “fundamental principles” upon which the 
Constitution is constructed’.
 
53
                                                 
51 George Winterton, ‘The Relationship between Commonwealth Legislative and Executive 
Power’ (2004) 25 Adelaide Law Review 21, 21 (footnote omitted). Goldsworthy has 
commented that ‘the provisions in Chapter II of the Constitution, dealing with the structure and 
powers of the executive government, are so terse and elliptical as to be positively misleading’: 
Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Australia: Devotion to Legalism’ in Jeffrey Goldsworthy (ed), 
Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative Study (2006) 106, 108. 
 Tate’s observation brings the discussion back 
to the question of the role of common law constitutionalism as advocated by 
Dyzenhaus – not that Dyzenhaus can be accused of parochial attachment to 
the common law of England in particular, however. As explored further 
below, Dyzenhaus’ argument is, in a sense, an international one. Brief 
consideration of these international dimensions helps to clarify the distinction 
52 Pamela Tate, ‘Some Observations on the Common Law and the Constitution’ (2008) 30 
Sydney Law Review 121, 123. 
53 Ibid. 
   2009                                                                      Common Law Constitutionalism  
 
 
 
93 
93 
between constitutional positivism and the common law constitutionalism 
advocated by Dyzenhaus. 
 
IV THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW AND 
‘CONSTITUTIONALISATION’ AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
 
It is important to observe that Dyzenhaus’ analysis represents not only a 
contribution to the public law of municipalities such as Australia, Canada or 
the USA, but also a contribution to debates in international law. For example, 
Dyzenhaus argues that constitutional positivism goes along with dualism at 
the international level,54 that is to say with the view that international 
agreements are external agreements entered into by the executive and not part 
of municipal law until and unless expressly so enacted. For Dyzenhaus, it is 
both more accurate and more desirable to treat international law and common 
law as two sides of the same coin. This is a version of the ‘monist’ approach 
to the status of international law vis-à-vis municipal law. For Dyzenhaus the 
law relating to human liberty and human rights is a seamless whole, along the 
lines advocated by Lauterpacht.55
Another debate in international law with which Dyzenhaus’ work connects 
closely is the debate over the ‘international rule of law’. Explorations of ‘the 
rule of law’ as an international phenomenon are thus of relevance.
  
56 In a 
general sense, any notion of the rule of law must treat municipal legal systems 
in the plural, that is to say must posit an effect or status of law that applies 
conceptually to more than one jurisdiction.57
                                                 
54 Dyzenhaus, above n 4, 191. 
 The concept of the rule of law is, 
so to speak, supranational or ‘anational’, an abstracted or general claim. While 
hardly trivial, this point is somewhat limited in itself. What is more 
challenging is the exploration of the rule of law as it applies to international 
55 Ibid 193; the monist approach is exemplified by the contemporary attitude of common law 
jurisdictions toward the direct incorporation of customary international law: see Morss, ‘Can 
Custom Be Incorporated in Law?’, above n 38, 93.  
56 Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Rule of International Law’ (2006) 30 Harvard Journal of Law and 
Public Policy 15, 25. 
57 Brian Tamanaha, On The Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (2004) 127; Brian 
Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law (2006). 
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agreements, expectations and regulations, and to obligations on collectives58
In this context Waldron makes an important point concerning the difference 
between the scope of the rule of law in the case of individual natural persons 
and in the case of governments. With respect to individual citizens, the rule of 
law might be said to coexist with unregulated spheres of conduct – setting 
limits on and enabling various forms of conduct but not defining individuals’ 
conduct in toto. This would be an orthodox liberal analysis. In contrast, 
Waldron argues, government action is entirely defined by adherence to rule of 
law; there are no legitimate residual ‘pockets of unregulated discretion’ or 
‘loopholes’.
 
or individuals deriving from international agreements.  
59 Government is fully constituted by law. And what obtains for 
municipal governments also obtains for the network of relationships between 
such governments (or other significant international entities) that is called 
international law. For international law is not a set of relationships among 
special kinds of otherwise anarchic individual.60 If it were, some ‘pockets of 
unregulated discretion’ might be legitimate – sovereign states would rightly 
treat international law as a regrettable but happily limited constraint on their 
freedom as individual actors. Instead, the sovereignty of a state is ‘determined 
by the rules of the international order’.61
Waldron’s sense of the rule of law as comprehensively determinative of 
governmental and international action leaves no space for individualistic 
discretion on the part of the executive. Nor would it seem to leave space for 
the appeal to values that, according to Dyzenhaus, is needed to complete and 
to legitimise the rule of law. Indeed such appeals to values might be seen as 
exemplars of the proscribed discretion. Waldron’s analysis – which, despite 
its theoretical theme, maintains a focus on the necessary constraint of 
executive powers – is extremely rich but it is at the same time ‘thin’. That is 
to say it is procedure-based rather than content-based (‘thick’); closer to 
constitutional positivism than to common law constitutionalism. Waldron’s 
argument noted above therefore becomes a key contribution to the 
development of constitutional positivism.  
 Rule of law in its international sense 
is constitutive of the legitimacy of the sovereign state. 
In the municipal context, Waldron counters constitutional entrenchment, for 
example the entrenchment of bills of rights, with an argument from 
                                                 
58 John R Morss, ‘The Legal Relations of Collectives: Belated Insights from Hohfeld’ (2009) 
22(2) Leiden Journal of International Law 289. 
59 Waldron, above n 56, 19. 
60 Ibid 21, 25. 
61 Ibid 21. 
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majoritarian democracy. The voice of the living should it is said be allowed to 
overrule the voice of the dead. This argument is of much less, if any, 
persuasiveness in the international sphere given that democracy at the 
international level remains elusive.62 Also, in the USA context in which 
Waldron is currently writing, some special factors apply to the evaluation of 
facts.63 Even so, Waldron’s remarks would seem to contribute to an emerging 
international constitutional positivism,64
At the same time Waldron’s argument posits a constitutionalisation process in 
international law. As a wider project, ‘constitutionalisation’ expresses the 
optimistic view that international law might come to be articulated, in part 
through some emergent or self-organising processes, into a scheme that 
converges in desirable and interesting ways with the typical features of public 
law in municipal settings.
 offering an alternative vision to the 
Dyzenhausian common law orientation. 
65 The constitutionalisation movement within 
international law looks favourably on the typical administrative law systems 
of municipalities, as providing models and inspiration for the improvement of 
regulation at the international level – including ways and means for exerting 
constraint on executive power.66
Some approaches to international constitutionalisation focus on supposed 
hierarchical relationships among international norms, and the work of Hans 
Kelsen might be thought of as representing an earlier version of this 
approach.
 
67
                                                 
62 Susan Marks, The Riddle of All Constitutions (2000); Susan Marks, ‘International Law, 
Democracy and the End of History,’ in Gregory Fox and Brad Roth (eds), Democratic 
Governance and International Law (2000) 532. 
 In contemporary versions, attention is focused in particular on 
63 The ‘political questions doctrine’ (under which fact-finding of certain kinds may be treated 
as an executive matter): see Waldron, above n 8, 1711; also see Rachel Barkow, ‘More 
Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial 
Supremacy’ (2002) 1102 Columbia Law Review 237, 239.  
64 Buchanan’s usage of the term Constitutional Positivism in relation to international law is 
idiosyncratic: Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: Moral 
Foundations for International Law (2004) 305. 
65 Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, and Richard Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law’ (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 15; Nico Krisch, ‘The 
Pluralism of Global Administrative Law’ (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 
247. 
66 See, similarly, the ‘ongoing institutionalization of the international legal order’ referred to by 
Georg Nolte and Helmut Aust, ‘Equivocal Helpers – Complicit States, Mixed Messages and 
International Law’ (2009) 58 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1, 28.    
67 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (1945). But ‘pigeon-holing’ Kelsen is always 
a difficult exercise. 
DEAKIN LAW REVIEW                                                                                              VOLUME 14 NO 1 
 
 
 
96 
96 
such superior norms as the peremptory norm or jus cogens.68 These 
international norms, with their evaluative or even frankly moralistic content 
(such as prohibitions on slavery), are in some ways difficult to localise in 
terms of the orthodox categories of the sources of international law.69 In their 
connection with larger value systems, which are presumed by international 
tribunals to underpin and to legitimise them, these peremptory norms to some 
extent resemble the norms articulated by municipal tribunals as constitutive of 
the common law.70
Although the extent of the resemblance should not be exaggerated, there are 
substantive conceptual links between common law constitutionalism and the 
form of international constitutionalism that fastens on hierarchical 
relationships among international norms in general and on the jus cogens in 
particular. Competing approaches to international constitutionalisation 
question the validity of peremptory norms and of supposed hierarchical 
relationships among international norms, favouring the sceptical analysis of 
Weil in this respect.
 It might also be said that the peremptory norms have 
become ‘entrenched’ in international jurisprudence.  
71 The public law contribution to this debate favours a 
legal positivist style.72
 
 
V CONCLUSION 
 
The above discussion of the international domain is no more than indicative of 
some of the interlinking issues that arise from the debate urged by Dyzenhaus 
between a common law and a positivist approach to constitutionalism. 
Executive power is a phenomenon not limited by the borders of states, even if 
systematic and sustainable forms of regulation of that power would seem to 
have been achieved more successfully within municipalities than beyond 
them. Thomas v Mowbray, like the Australian Communist Party case before 
                                                 
68 John R Morss, ‘Good Global Governance: Custom, the Cosmopolitan and International Law’ 
(2007) 3 International Journal of Law in Context 59. 
69 Malcolm Shaw, International Law (5th ed) (2003) 66, 77. 
70 Gerald Postema, ‘Custom in International Law: A Normative Practice Account’ in Amanda 
Perreau-Saussine and James Murphy (eds), The Nature of Customary Law 279; also see 
Michael Lobban, ‘Custom, Common Law Reasoning and the Law of Nations in the Nineteenth 
Century’ in Perreau-Saussine and Murphy (eds) at 256. 
71 Prosper Weil, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?’ (1983) 77 American 
Journal of International Law 413.  
72 Benedict Kingsbury, ‘The Concept of “Law” in Global Administrative Law’ (2009) 20 
European Journal of International Law 23. 
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it, arose from the attempts of governments to (as they saw it) protect their 
citizenry from geopolitical threats of an international nature. Notoriously, 
governments sometimes find it hard to distinguish between protecting their 
citizenry and protecting themselves. They may also, on occasion, over-extend 
the notions of ‘threat’ and of ‘emergency’. It would seem impossible entirely 
to displace the role of political and (broadly speaking) military judgment in 
seeking value-free historical arbitration over such executive decisions. When 
the executive’s identification of a threat consists of identifying persons as 
threats (communist sympathisers, associates of terrorist organisations) the 
imponderables escalate. A sober approach to facts, including notorious facts 
and constitutional facts, is especially demanded of the judiciary when such 
perceived threats are responded to by government in the form of legislation. 
This might be thought of as a correlative of the separation of powers – a 
separation of responsibilities, as it were.  
It was the independence of the judicial branch under Australia’s Constitution 
that made possible the combination of  ‘success’ for the Commonwealth 
government in Thomas v Mowbray and its ‘failure’ in the Australian 
Communist Party case. There seems no good reason to look beyond the 
separation of powers as such to some higher (or deeper) level of common law 
values, as Dyzenhaus urges, to explain this set of outcomes. To describe the 
High Court’s cautious reliance on the Constitution’s textual provisions as 
‘superficial’73, thus seems mistaken. As Dyzenhaus emphasises, legislation 
should identify mischiefs and restrain itself from seeking to identify 
miscreants. In other words, ‘Acts of Attainder’ (and similar kinds of 
overreaching) are to be deplored.74 In both cases it is a matter of restraint, not 
superficiality – of ‘proper reaching’ as opposed to either judicial or legislative 
overreaching. Likewise, overreaching by the executive is to be regulated. It is 
thus potentially misleading for the three branches of government to be 
described as collaborating in a joint ‘rule of law project’ if, by that 
description, tensions between the branches are defined as subsidiary to the 
pursuit of that team project.75
The question of law’s constitutional response to states of emergency must 
therefore be considered in the light of law’s long debates between values-
driven and procedure-driven accounts of justice, between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ 
 Instead, tensions between the three branches are 
of the essence of the constitutional arrangement. The approach labelled 
‘constitutional positivism’ by Dyzenhaus recognises this.  
                                                 
73 Dyzenhaus, above n 4, 81. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid 147. 
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accounts of the rule of law and of the separation of powers, between natural 
law and legal positivist orientations. What has been argued above is summed 
up by Tamanaha’s observation with respect to the rule of law that ‘judges, 
when rendering their decisions, must be committed to searching for the 
strongest, most correct legal answer’.76
 
 Law is a constraint on the judiciary as 
well as on the executive. Despite the attractions of an appeal to values and 
traditions, with the accompanying rhetoric, those features of organised law 
that we call constitutional features exert their constraining influence in ways 
that call for a more restrained vocabulary.   
 
                                                 
76 Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End, above n 57, 250 (emphasis in original). Also see 
Maksymilian Del Mar, ‘Review of Brian Z Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End’ (2007) 66 
Cambridge Law Journal 468.   
